

Kokho K. (2022). Economic and development policies in the North Eastern Region and current condition. In Murayama, Mayumi., Hazarika, Sanjoy. and Gill, Preeti. (Eds.) *Northeast India and Japan engagement through connectivity* (53-76). Routledge.

Hazarika, Sanjoy. (2022). Introduction: East by Northeast. In Murayama, Mayumi. Hazarika, Sanjoy. and Gill, Preeti., (Eds.), *Northeast India and Japan engagement through connectivity* (1-16). Routledge.

Kuznetsov, A. (2014). *Theory and practice of paradiplomacy: Subnational governments in international affairs*. Routledge.

Maini, Singh Tridivesh. (2014). Gujarat, Rajasthan and Punjab: The Need for a Border States Group. *The Hindu Centre for Politics & Public Policy*, 6: 1-31.

Mehra, Ajay K. (2013). India's party system: Emerging Trajectories. In Ajay K. Mehra (Eds.) *Party system in India*, United States: Lancer.

Majumdar, M. (2018). India's Act East Policy Begins in Myanmar. In Sarma, Atul and Choudhury, Saswati. (Eds.), *Mainstreaming the Northeast in India's Look and Act East Policy* (pp. 287-300). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore.

Osada, Noriyuki. (2022). Partitioned lives: Myanmar-born Indians in the Manipur borderland. In Murayama, Mayumi., Hazarika, Sanjoy. and Gill, Preeti. (Eds.), *Northeast India and Japan engagement through connectivity* (223-237). Routledge.

Pattanaik, S. S. (2014). Federalising India's Neighbourhood policy: making the States stakeholders. *Strategic Analysis*, 38(1), 31-48.

Pattanaik, S. S. (2016). Sub-regionalism as new regionalism in South Asia: India's role. *Strategic Analysis*, 40(3), 210-217.

Phukon, Girin. (2020). *Federalism and Assam: Legacies of contemporary politics*. India: DVS Publishers.

Sridharan, Kripa (2003) "Federalism and foreign relations: the nascent role of the Indian states.", *Asian Studies Review*, 27(4): 463-489.

Sharma, C. K., & Swenden, W. (2017). Continuity and change in contemporary Indian federalism. *India Review*, 16(1), 1-13.

Toppo, H. N. (2016). India's interests in emerging subregional cooperation: Opportunities and challenges. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 20(1), 33-64.

Tewari, F. (2017). Paradiplomacy in India: Evolution and operationalisation. *ORF India*.

Tillin, Louis. (2019). *Indian Federalism*. India: Oxford University Press.

Wolff, Stefan (2007). Paradiplomacy: Scope, opportunities and challenges.

Wolff, S. (2007). Paradiplomacy: scope, opportunities and challenges. *The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs*, 10(1), 141-150.

PERSONALITY AND NEGOTIATIONS: A STUDY OF ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE AND PERVEZ MUSHARRAF AND AGRA TALKS

Dr. Bhupendra Kumar

As an individual's motive may change or may not change the state's status quo position, the individual's cognition decides whether an individual leader is inclined towards war or peaceful negotiation. Thirdly, personal traits involving behavioural aspects like a bellicose or peaceful individual and delusional elements such as the grandiose vision of leaders shape other states' behaviour. Also, the leader's ambitions and objectives alter or destabilise the international system. Lastly, the social context of actors influences the negotiation process. The above discussions entail the imposing role of personality on negotiation and diplomacy; in this context, the paper has explored it theoretically. The paper has examined the role of personality in negotiation by taking one case each from India and Pakistan. It will analyse the individual characteristics of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf and their impact on the diplomatic process involving peace and conflict by examining the Agra talks in 2001.

Personality and Negotiation: Theoretical Discussions

Understanding various dimensions of personality has been done in recent times and in different ages where several philosophers and thinkers have investigated and dwelled on human behaviour. Their quests have been wider than investigating to understand personality and its characteristics. Their reflections pertain to the tensions between society and individuals; added to it, their apprehension was to bring ideal constructs to resolve all tensions. In this regard, Plato's ideas of individual qualities based on different attributes such as reason, courage, and appetite explain the corresponding composition of society based upon differentiation of needs where the king represents courage, the philosopher consists of reason, and merchants dwell on appetite (Plato 1969). In the same period, ancient Indian philosopher Kautilya talked of several characteristics attributing a king to success or failure (Saran 2017:12).

Defining personality has been proven difficult as it requires navigating multiple perspectives. In the history of scientific psychology, competing perspectives attempt to define 'personality', such as the psychodynamic perspective, the learning perspective, the humanistic perspective, the trait perspective, the biological perspective and the cognitive perspective. Multiple definitions of personality bring distinct concerns to each perspective. No single authoritative definition of personality can entail multiple conceptions of personality. However, for a functional purpose, we may define personality as a sum of multiple qualities of individuals, such as traits, motives, cognitions, and situational aspects.

Negotiation and personality

Negotiation constitutes the cornerstone of international politics, and it is considered a binding force that holds continuities and discontinuities of the relations between different international actors, such as nations, international organisations, and non-state actors. The term negotiation may refer to individual acts or institutional acts. However, when we talk about it, negotiation primarily refers to how different actors in international politics immerse themselves in exchanging aims and objectives. The importance of individuals and their characteristics has received less attention in the scholarly discussion of negotiation theories. David G. Winter, in his study of the relationship between individuals and politics, states the relationship between individual personality and its association with the institution (Winter 2003).

Byman and Pollack underline the importance of personality in international politics. Their observations entail that the role of the individual becomes essential, mainly when power is concentrated during conflict and significant change (Byman and Pollack 2001). The ability of individuals, their goals and intentions changes the action of their own countries and transforms and shapes the reactions of the other states (Byman and Pollack 2001). In everyday international politics, the diplomatic relationship of one country with another country depends upon the characteristics and quality of the leadership. It may bring good relationships or bring hostility to other countries. For example, under Hitler's leadership, the other European countries' responses changed drastically vis-a-vis Germany (Carr 2002).

Generally, International politics has been considered as a result of historical determinism. This view rather distorts actual reality where individuals wield power and bring changes in the life of people. To see world politics as

the outcome of 'man's free will' brings clarity to understanding the process of forming reality. Albert Camus noted that there is no truth, only truth. No single theory can ever present all international situations. This tension between man's free will and historical determinism has resonated well in structure-agency debates in world politics (Isaak 1975).

Outcomes driven by personal factors shape people involved in diplomatic activities equally. The understanding of social facts such as existing values, social and political institutions, personalities, and game rules are reflected in the very process of negotiation. Impersonal categories such as history, political process and rules of games have always been seen as the absolute constraining factors that leave very little scope for individual characteristics. Therefore, an analytical attempt to focus on individual qualities that shape their surroundings is essential. According to Robert Isaak, by focusing on the psychological tensions of people interacting with other people in the arena of the world, the scientific grounds of psychology, economics, biology, sociology, and political science can be integrated with the humanistic interests of political theory, history, and philosophy brings a comprehensive explanation of human behaviour in world politics (Isaak 1975).

Robert Putnam states that international negotiations represent a two-level game (Putnam 1988). The first level, namely the national level, includes different factors such as leadership, public opinion and non-governmental actors such as opposition parties and various other pressure groups that shape government policies. The second level includes the international level, where the national government maximises national-level interest in international negotiations. At the national level, the individual encompassing political actors play an important role in formulating important government policies toward other nations; also, at the international level, the role of a statesman in defending the national interest constitutes a significant role.

The above discussion necessitates a systemic study of the role of personality in negotiation and diplomacy which requires the identification of various components of personality, such as traits, cognition, motives and social context and their likely impact on diplomacy. Each of these components of personality plays a specific role in diplomacy. Firstly, an individual's motive may or may not change the status quo position of a country. For example, Hitler was deeply unsatisfied with the post-World War First arrangement, and he pursued to avert Germany's position in the international order and sought to question the status quo position of Germany.

Secondly, an individual's cognition, such as an inclination toward war and diplomacy, shapes the outlook of a state. It depends upon whether a leader is inclined toward war or peaceful negotiation. In the history of international relations, the nature of leadership determines the responses of countries. After the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference's outcome in 1919 was a compromise between US President Woodrow Wilson's idealist vision and the belligerent's leadership of France and Britain.

Thirdly, Individual traits involving behavioural aspects like a bellicose or peaceful individual and delusional aspects such as craziness and grandiose vision of leaders shape other states' behaviour. Furthermore, leaders' ambitions and objectives alter or destabilise the international system, such as Stalin and Hitler's visions. Lastly, the social context of political actors also shapes the negotiation process because of its integral association with the actor's identity.

The above discussion brings out another important aspect of foreign policy, which signifies the importance of heads of state, namely presidents and prime ministers, who perform most diplomatic roles on the international stage consisting of bilateral and multilateral meetings with their counterparts. The summit signifies the practice of diplomacy at the highest level, and it unfolds leaders' capacities to mould relationships with other countries. In this context, the research has firstly examined short biographical sketches of both political leaders - Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf, and then the paper has discussed the process and outcome of the Agra summit.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was born in Gwalior in a traditional Hindu Brahmin family on December 25, 1924. His grandfather had migrated from Bateshwar in Uttar Pradesh to Gwalior. His father and Grandfather were schooled in Sanskrit rituals. Conversations used in his home were in Hindi. His father, Krishna Bihari, was a teacher and an employee of the Scindhias. Atal spent his earliest years in Bateshwar. Most of Atal's early literacy took place at home; with great fondness, he remembered his mother's reciting of the Ramayana and stories from the Hindu epics in Sanskrit and Awadhi from his grandfather (Choudhary 2023:17). Ramacharitmanas has a particular influence on him, later Ram's life became a major inspiration to him (Choudhary 2023:17).

Vajpayee studied at the local Gorakhi School, funded by the Maharaja of Gwalior. In 1941, Vajpayee entered Victoria College. In college, he became

familiar with Marxism and Socialism, Gandhian thinking and Arya Samaji. From his college days, he started writing poems, which elicited a mixture of ideas which influenced him. In college, Vajpayee developed an aversion to the caste system in Hinduism, which he saw as a threat to Hindu unity. It is important to notice that by the late 1930s, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has expanded to non-Marathi speaking areas. A Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) functionary converted the teenage Vajpayee into what he remained with his life. Though Vajpayee entered wearing his sacred thread, he removed it soon after joining the RSS. As swayamsevak (volunteer), Vajpayee regularly visited morning shakhas (branches). Attending Shakhas, he learnt the RSS version of Hindu History, which primarily focused on Shivaji, the Maratha Empire and the third battle of Panipat of 1761. Vajpayee also noticed the historical lessons translated within the RSS organisation. It is essential to be noted the RSS has been championing the causes of Hindutva politics. It aims to promote consciousness of the one Hindu Nationhood (Sitapati 2020:19).

Vajpayee joined a law program and MA in Political Science at the DAV College in Kanpur in 1945. It is important to notice that Vajpayee's father, now a retired school Inspector, joined the college as an equal. Later a classmate told Vajpayee virtually grew under his father's shadow (Sitapati 2020: 21). Vajpayee continued studying law during the tumult of the partition. By late August 1947, Vajpayee, a 22-year young man, was appointed as the first joint editor of a Hindi monthly Rashtradharma launched by the RSS in Lucknow, and a few months later, he joined the weekly Panchajanaya as the editor (Choudhary 2023:53). Young Atal had no idea about the larger picture and RSS's broader activities such as its role in partition riots, self-appointed vigilantism, publication of anti-government propaganda which would lead to a serious discord between Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the architects of newly independent Republic of India (Choudhary 2023:54). It is relevant to look into an essay authored by Atal in Rashtradharma, where he staunchly defended the cultural revival of Hindu and blamed Muslims for the partition of India and most importantly, he defended the dream of Akhand Bharat – a reunified India (Choudhary 2023:61). Following the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, there had been a ban on the RSS, which was lifted in July 1949. As Atal was only associated with the RSS for less than six months and then again only as an editor, he was not arrested.

Vajpayee contested his first election in 1955, which he lost; in the General election in 1957, he won Balrampur, a parliamentary constituency and entered the Parliament aged 33, and he became the leader of the party 'Bharatiya Jan Sangha' in the Lok Sabha. Vajpayee won praise from Jawaharlal Nehru in the Parliament because of Vajpayee's foreign policy opinions in Hindi. Nehru also predicted him to be the future Prime Minister (Sitapati 2020:50). Vajpayee's first speech in the Parliament was on foreign policy, which remained his favourite subject throughout his public life (Sinha 2020:3). Atal's writings on foreign policy displayed ingenuity; he viewed foreign policy as realist, unsentimental, and transactional (Choudhary 2023:92).

In 1977, the Janata Government came into power, defeating Indira Gandhi. Morarji Desai became the prime minister, and Vajpayee became his foreign minister. It is essential to be noted that there has been continuity in the foreign policy outlook of India during Desai's tenure. The Janata government fell in 1979. During the 1980s, Vajpayee's political career was dormant. During the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, Lal Krishna Advani became the prominent face of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Following the mid-term election after the brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, BJP won 119 MP in a house of 542, the Congress with 221 seats and other allies formed the government headed by PV Narasimha. Advani became the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. After December 1992, the demolition of Babri Masjid and its subsequent happenings started shifting the BJP's focus away from Advani and towards Vajpayee (Sinha 2020:8).

Vajpayee headed the government in 1996, which lasted only thirteen days; then again, he became Prime Minister following the March 1998 election. One of the important decisions he has taken was the nuclear tests. According to Vajpayee, India has to be recognised as a great power, which is India's destiny. Once again, his government fell short majority, which he would again regain in the next election. In 2004, his government was replaced by the Congress-led government headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Personally, Vajpayee was a shy person and generally kept to himself; when present, he was a man of very few words (Sinha 2020). Vajpayee was a mesmerising public speaker; he could hold audiences, and not just supporters in thrall, but not just through eloquence.

In relation to Pakistan, Vajpayee sought peaceful relations. Once, he said, "We can choose our relatives, not our neighbours (Sitapati

2020:236). After nuclear tests in both countries, the Sharif government, crossing its swords with the military by firing its top commander and following an activist foreign policy, invited Atal Bihari Vajpayee to the United Nations General Assembly's sidelines in 1998 (Shah 2014). Vajpayee accepted the invitation, following its famous Lahore declaration was signed between both countries, aiming to bring peace and stability to both countries. The peace process between both countries suffered grievous injuries following the Kargil War in 1999 and after the arrival of the military general Pervez Musharraf. The Agra talk aimed to resume the dialogue process and resolve longstanding disputes between both countries, which has been discussed in the later part.

Pervez Musharraf

The biography of Pervez Musharraf highlights some specific aspects of his personality, comprising his family background, birthplace and the impact of partition on his initial life. Pervez Musharraf was born in a middle-class family on August 11, 1943, at his ancestral residence Neharwali Haveli, Mohallah Saad Ullah, Old Delhi. Pervez Musharraf was born in the cosmopolitan city of Delhi, representing the fusion of multiple traditions. The Nehar Wali Haveli is historically important as the Chief Wazir of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah II, inhabited this place. The surrounding of Haveli was once inhabited by many of the Mughal noble families. Even after the arrival of the British, Old Delhi continued to be the thriving centre of Muslim protocol, culture and tradition.

Like many other places, Delhi was one of the worst affected areas during the partition. Mutual trust and confidence between Hindus and Muslims were shattered in Delhi's flagrance of hatred and madness. Pervez Musharraf, with his mother, father and two brothers, left Delhi in 1947. His family arrived in Karachi on August 15 1947. Pervez Musharraf vividly remembers his arrival in Karachi in his memoir, 'Line of Fire', "I remembered, too, the swarm of thankful people who greeted them. There was food, there was joy, there was laughter, and there was a lot of hugging and kissing. There were Thanksgiving prayers too" (Musharraf 2006).

It is significant to notice that Pervez Musharraf was born in a traditional middle-class family. His mother was highly educated; it must have left a deep impression on the personality of Musharraf. In an interview, his mother, Zarin Musharraf, casually revealed that she had been greatly

influenced by progressive intellectuals such as Sajjad Zaheer and Sibte Hassan¹. (Ali 2003). Tariq Ali wondered upon Zarin's bold revelation to claim friendship with two convicted traitors. Though she did not directly mention that her views had genetically influenced her children, the impact of her liberal views on Musharraf cannot be denied. Since Musharraf was brought up in a liberal family, he had never acted as a dictatorial figure, and during his entire period of presidency, he never evoked any conservative policies as former General Jia ul Haq had done during his tenure.

Musharraf received favourable conditions for the growth in Pakistan. As Musharraf's family, who migrated to Pakistan, was from a highly educated middle-class family, this proved advantageous. Pervez Musharraf recounts that his initial years in Karachi were happy days and the hardship of migrating to a new country, overcome by hope and excitement. He narrates that a metamorphosis took place in him in the first months and years after partition, and he found the soil of Pakistan that was natural to him (Musharraf 2006).

After two years in Karachi, his father was posted to the Pakistan embassy in Ankara, Turkey. In Turkey, he, along with his family, stayed for seven years. Musharraf remembers his stay in Turkey as the formative years hugely influencing his worldview.

His career in elite military services started in 1993 when he was appointed as the director-general of military operations (DGMO), the military think tank of Pakistan. In 1995, he was promoted to lieutenant general in Mangla. He also became part of the army's highest decision-making body—the Corps Commanders' Conference (Musharraf 2006: 77). In his memoir Musharraf remembers ten years of the alternate democratic government between 1989 and 1999 as the worst kind of governance Pakistan ever had faced (Musharraf 2006). After the controversial retirement of Chief of army staff (COAS) General Jehangir Karamat, Musharraf was surprisingly appointed as the thirteenth chief of the army in Pakistan. The Kargil conflict focused on then-General Pervez Musharraf, who had planned the entire war script.

¹Sajjad Zaheer and Sibte Hassan were two of the finest literary critics of the subcontinent. Both joined Communist Party and after partitions, they moved to Pakistan to organise Communist Party. In the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, Sibte Hasan, Sajjad Zaheer, and poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz were imprisoned. The former prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, intervened, and Sajjad Zaheer was released from prison and then returned to India.

When Pervez Musharraf became Pakistan's chief executive, many people worldwide assumed him as an anti-Western fundamentalist Muslim. However, when his brother Dr Naved Musharraf, a doctor in Chicago, was approached, he introduced a different conception of his brother. He said, "Pervez is a secular-minded man, and Pervez believes in the separation of church and state. He does not want a theocracy" (Dugger 1999). If we observe the entire tenure of Musharraf, he was certainly different from previous army generals in Pakistan. For instance, unlike General Zia ul-Haq, referred to as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Musharraf likes to call himself the Chief Executive (Schofield 2010).

In the 2003 Organisation of Islamic Countries Summit, Musharraf unfurled his grand vision of 'moderate enlightenment'. His vision of moderate enlightenment appeared in the post-9/11 world when there were widespread linkages of Islam with fundamentalism, fundamentalism to extremism, and extremism to terrorism (Musharraf 2004).

When Musharraf assumed the presidency in Pakistan, his movements were closely watched by the Indian government and analysts, who already knew Musharraf's alleged role in the Kargil conflict (Lavoy 2009). Though the arrival of army rule in Pakistan surprised India and the rest of the world, it is not hidden that the military establishment has been the most powerful institution in Pakistan. Three generals already had ruled Pakistan's side-stepping democracy.

Pakistan's approach to the relationship with India has always been fraught with distrust and suspicion. Pakistan always views India in terms of its existential threat. The negotiating structures in Pakistan that involve negotiating with India are much more centralised (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011). There is a clear distinction of authority between civilian leaders and military leaders in this respect in Pakistan. In comparison to their civilian counterparts, military leaders enjoy more power. Even in terms of legitimacy, the military enjoys more power. In October 2004, he proposed that he was ready to move away from Pakistan's longstanding demand for a plebiscite as called by the United Nations Resolution in 1948-49, provided that India would not insist that Line of Control (LOC) be accepted as the International border. In 2006, Musharraf proposed that people's free movement should be allowed along both sides of Kashmir (Schaffer 2009: 186-187). Such announcements by civilian leaders are not possible in Pakistan.

According to Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, the sense of sovereign equality in Pakistan vis-a-vis India is the product of Islamabad's frustrations over India's perceived readiness to use its power to damage Pakistan's interest (Schaffer and Schafer 2011:146). It has been the longstanding aspect of Pakistan's negotiation strategy.

The analysis of Pakistan's negotiating strategy reveals the importance of its military establishment. For example, Musharraf's background in the military gives him more leverage in negotiating with India than any civilian leader would have. Moreover, at this point, the role of the personality of military leaders becomes vital in negotiation. Next follows the analysis of the Agra talk between India and Pakistan.

Agra Summit, July 15-16, 2001

After the arrival of Musharraf in Pakistan, the first diplomatic stand-off between India and Pakistan occurred on December 24, 1999, when a band of five, Pakistan based Islamic radicals, hijacked an Indian Airlines Airbus carrying one hundred seventy passengers when the plane was going from Kathmandu to New Delhi. Indian government secured passengers by handing over three militant prisoners to the hijackers. This hijack episode was followed by the killing of six Indians across the Line of Control and the rising militant activities in Kashmir. Strobe Talbott (2004) mentioned that Pakistan was clearly involved in both incidents, and he praised the Indian government's extraordinary restraint on these issues (Talbott 2004: 187-188). Strobe Talbott's observation underlined the growing importance of India in the international community. Then within India, the political party in power, BJP, had a strong anti-Pakistan feeling. However, Vajpayee was an exception because he realised that without having an understanding with Pakistan, he would not receive the attention he sought from world leaders (Raghavan 2017:247).

Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistan Ambassador to the United States, said otherwise when he noted the intense international pressures resulted in both countries agreeing to continue the dialogue for a feasible solution to a number of contentious issues (Hussain 2007:104). Before Musharraf, Pakistani leaders had pitched hard for a negotiated settlement of disputes with India; however, it remained centred around the Kashmir issue. Therefore, it was up to Musharraf to continue dialogue with India. In his assessment of the India and Pakistan relationship, Musharraf mentioned that he had taken bold

steps towards a rapprochement with India because this step would bring socio-economic cooperation and development in South Asia and, further, he stated that the military could not solve problems between both countries and relationship between both countries could be improved only through diplomacy (Musharraf 2006:297).

Talks, after all, have started after a gap of two years; India initiated the process of dialogue with Pakistan. The Ceasefire between India and Pakistan did not bring any cumulative results. Moreover, the secessionist group Hurriyat had been adamant about discussing with Pakistan (Dixit 2002). J. N. Dixit mentioned that then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was not ready for the talk. However, Advani and other senior colleagues pressed for taking something bold and dramatic to break the deadlock followed after the Kargil war in 1999 (Dixit 2002).

Vajpayee formally invited Pervez Musharraf on May 24 2001, which Musharraf readily accepted. The tentative schedule for the summit was decided for mid-July which ultimately took place between the 14th and 16th of July (Dixit 2002:398). Further, the Indian government announced several unilateral initiatives, such as offering scholarships for Pakistani students and cultural exchanges. The Pakistani government's response could have been more enthusiastic; their unilateral focus had been on the Kashmir issue. In a statement, Musharraf announced that Kashmir is "the unfinished part of the partition" and should be given more importance, though he had no objection to discussing other issues (Dixit 2002:400).

Before going ahead, examining the reasons behind Musharraf's acceptance of India's offer to talk is crucial. G Parthasarathy observed that Musharraf was personable and warm-hearted and was different from other military rulers in the past. Professor Kalim Bahadur traced the reason behind Musharraf's enthusiasm. Firstly, the Pakistani regime knew India was not on the verge of military and economic collapse. Secondly, Pakistan could not compel India to accept the UN resolutions internationally. Thirdly, Islamabad had started to lose the support of the Islamic world regarding the Kashmir issue. It happened because then Prime Minister Vajpayee had successful visits to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia, which caused anxiety in the Pakistani establishment. Fourthly, Musharraf was aware that the nuclear status of Pakistan could not help it win a war against India. Fifthly, Pakistan's deteriorating economic condition compelled Musharraf to compromise with India, whose economy had been growing impressively. Lastly, Musharraf

realised the fragile condition of Pakistan, where various terrorist groups fostered by ISI had started to lose control of Islamabad and had established direct control with the Taliban.

Pervez Musharraf, in his memoir, mentioned that he accepted the invitation after realising that a military solution could not solve problems between both countries, and diplomacy was the best way forward (Musharraf 2006). Musharraf mentioned that he was upbeat about the visit to India. He reached New Delhi on July 15, 2001, and began a formal dialogue with Prime Minister Vajpayee on the morning of July 16, 2001. Musharraf mentioned that they prepared a joint draft that would be acceptable to both. It contained a declaration of the condemnation of terrorism and recognition that Kashmir needed a resolution to improve bilateral relations (Musharraf 2006). However, Musharraf observed India rejected the draft resolution.

Further attempts to redraft also have yet to yield any results. Finally, Agra Summit was concluded without any substantive outcome. The official spokesperson informed, "I am disappointed to announce that though the commencement of a process has taken place, the destination of an agreed joint statement has not been reached" (Prasad 2001). After the summit, when people saw nothing happening, Vajpayee, an experienced, highly respected man, did not see off Musharraf (Dulat et al. 2018:146). Musharraf departed for Islamabad at midnight night on July 16.

The result of the Agra summit has been vigorously debated and analysed. In The Asian Age newspaper, HY Sharada² The most distasteful aspect of a two-day vigorous summit was the absence of documents and no leaks (Prasad 2001). The failure of the Agra Talk raised many questions. What were the reasons behind the failures of the Agra talk?

According to Pakistani foreign minister Abdul Sattar, Musharraf projected his persuasive views on the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute to a spellbound audience in both countries, while his counterpart Jaswant Singh found Musharraf a 'belligerent' and grandstanding fever had induced Musharraf into a great deal of unrestrained comment (Raghavan 2017:250). The draft statement negotiated between both countries did not bring progress on the issue of Kashmir and terrorism. Later a long meeting between Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Musharraf took place to see if matters still could be resolved, but that resulted without any substantial outcome (Raghavan 2017:251).

According to J. N. Dixit (2002), there were inherent contradictions between the leaders' objectives, Pervez Musharraf and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. India initiated a talk with Pakistan because it was annoyed by Hurriyat. Moreover, India was worried due to the failure of the ceasefire. Vajpayee genuinely desired to normalise the acrimonious relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad. Moreover, he wanted to focus on border terrorism and tackle regional security issues arising from South Asia's nuclearisation. India also wanted to respond to international concerns and anxieties regarding the Kashmir issue. In contrast, Musharraf's objective differed from New Delhi's concern.

First, Musharraf successfully politicised the Kashmir issue, which the Indian government did not seek to highlight during the talk. Musharraf met with the Hurriyat leaders and publicly termed Pakistan-sponsored terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir as freedom fighters (Rajya Sabha August 8, 2001:244-45). Secondly, using the summit platform, Musharraf undermined the previous agreement reached by both countries. He disconnected Lahore and Simla's agreement (Dixit 2002 and Musharraf 2006).

Most importantly, by using the Agra platform, Musharraf endorsed his leadership in Pakistan. Musharraf's invitation to India was vigorously debated in the Indian Parliament. Dr Karan Singh³ (Rajya Sabha 2001) observed Agra Summit as a failure, and the Indian government, which had initially refused to talk with Musharraf because he was a military dictator. Further, he stated that the Indian government's invitation appeared to him as a blessing; India not only welcomed the General but also did 'Rajtilak', i.e. coronation to him, and this indeed not only fully legitimised General Musharraf but also empowered him, as far as his country and the rest of the world is concerned (Rajya Sabha 2001:265-266).

It can be observed that the statement of Dr Karan Singh was not about his disapproval of Musharraf's visit, but it was about how successfully Musharraf utilised his visit to Agra to endorse his position in Pakistan and to the rest of the world. In a widely published press conference on July 20, 2001, he laid Agra's responsibility on the Indian government with personal praise for Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He categorically asserted that the relationship between India and Pakistan could be normalised only if

² H. Y. Sharada was a former advisor to the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

the status of Kashmir is resolved within the framework of Pakistan's objective (Dixit 2002).

Conclusion

The present study offers a theoretical understanding of international politics by exploring unit-level variables. Personality comprising traits, motives, world views, and cognitions has been conceived as the unit-level variable, which provided an analytical framework for this research. The research establishes the link between an individual's personality and its impact on negotiation. It has integrated various theoretical conceptions of personality from the psychology discipline, especially political psychology, with the theoretical concept of negotiation and foreign policy analysis. A theoretical understanding of the role of personality and its impact on negotiations has been conceived and applied to investigate Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf's personalities and their impact on negotiations in the context of the Agra Talk. The research examined short biographical sketches of political leaders - Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf; it explored leaders' world views, careers, and bringing ups. Then, the research comprehensively discussed the outcomes and process of the Agra talks.

The Agra talks have several implications, which have been discussed earlier. If we observe the entire Agra talk between India and Pakistan, it has failed. However, the impact of failure was rather more upon the Indian side than Pakistan. Under Atal Bihari Vajpayee's leadership, India had unilaterally taken the initiative to continue dialogue with Pakistan. Vajpayee sought an equation with Pakistan to engage with the world on a whole range of issues which otherwise eclipsed due to a state of tension with Pakistan. Though Musharraf had shown his willingness to engage with India, he had his agenda. Firstly, he successfully used it to endorse his military rule in Pakistan, and secondly, he successfully highlighted the Kashmir issue internationally. Still, if there was any chance of revival of the peace process between India and Pakistan, the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament belied and buried that prospect.

³Dr Karan Singh was a Rajya Sabha member in 2001; he is the son of the late Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir. He served as Sadr-i-Riyasat and Governor of Jammu and Kashmir.

References

Choudhary, Abhishek (2023), *Vajpayee: The Ascent of the Hindu Right 1924-1977*, Delhi: Pan Macmillan.

Dixit, J. N. (2002), *India-Pakistan in War and Peace*, London: Routledge.

Dugger, Celia W (1999), "Pakistan Ruler Seen as 'Secular-Minded Muslim'" *The New York Times*, 26 October 1999. [Online: Web] Accessed 6June 2014 URL:<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/26/world/pakistan-ruler-seen-as-secular-minded-muslim.html?pagewanted=print>

Hussain, Zahid (2007), *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Issac, Robert A.(1975), *Individual and World Politics*, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press.

Lavoy, Peter R. (2009), "Introduction: the Importance of the Kargil Conflict" in Lavoy et al, (eds.) *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Musharraf, Pervez (2006), In *the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, UK Simon and Schuster.

Musharraf, Pervez (2000), "Foreign Policy of Pakistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, 53(2/3): 43-56.

Musharraf, Pervez (2004), "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation", *Washington Post*, 1 June 2004, [online: web] Accessed 29 Oct.2013: URL <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html>.

Plato (1969), *Plato: Five Great Dialogues; Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic*, New York: Gramercy Books.

Prasad, H.Y. Sharada, "Agra Summit, in brief", *The Asian Age*: July 25, 2001.

Raghavan, T.C.A. (2017), *The People Next Door: The Curious History of India's Relations with Pakistan*, Noida: Harper Collins Publishers India.

*Rajya Sabha Debate (2001), "Discussion on the Statement of Prime Minister: Recent Summit – Level Talks Held Between India and Pakistan in Agra", 8 August, 2001, File Number - ID_193_08082001_13_p239_p270_9: 239-270, New Delhi: Parliament. [Online: Web Accessed 9 July, 2014 URL: <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/43453>.

Saran, Shyam (2017), *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century*, New Delhi: Juggernaut.

Sattar, Abdul (2007), *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A concise History*, London: Oxford University Press.

Schaffer, Howard B. (2009), *The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir*, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Schaffer, Howard B. and Schaffer C. Teresita (2011), *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace.

Schofield, Victoria (2010), "Pakistan: benign dictatorship", *Asian Affairs*, 31(1):51-56.

Sinha, Shakti (2020), *Vajpayee: The Years That Changed India*, Gurgaon: Penguin Vintage.

Sitapati, Vinay (2020), *Jugalbandi: The BJP Before Modi*, Gurgaon: Penguin Viking.

*Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar on 'General Musharraf's Visit to India – Prospects For Indo-Pak Relations (Organised at Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi on 22nd June, 2001), *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 2001: 57-181.

Talbott, Strobe (2004), *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb*, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Winter, David G (2003), "Personality and Political Behaviour", in David O Seas et al. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, New York: Oxford University Press.

FROM THE MARGINS: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLANTATION LABOUR ACT, 1951 IN THE TEA GARDENS OF ASSAM

Krishangi Saikia

Dr. Bipul Das

Abstract

Tea Gardens are a site of marginalisation, resulting from the remnants of a colonial past of slavery, servitude and exploitation. Called as enclave societies, tea gardens host a number of communities that have experienced slack from the authorities, both in colonial and post colonial times. The Plantation Labour Act, 1951 was a milestone legislation for improving the conditions of the tea garden workers by providing necessary benefits for an improved life. The legislation provided an impetus on the industry to incur these 'social welfare costs'. However, cases of rampant abuse of power and privilege have eroded the credibility of the legislation. Moreover, amalgamation of the legislation into the Code on Occupational Safety and Health, 2020 and the Social Security Code, 2020 has put the effectiveness of the legislation into question. This paper highlights the above mentioned concerns in the light of the effectiveness of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 in the context of the tea gardens of Assam.

Key words: Labour, Plantation, State, Tea gardens, Women Workers.

Introduction

Plantations are a paradox in their own light. They are a site of cheap labour, providing both direct and indirect employment to millions of workers and also contribute enormously to the economy of the region. Many scholars on tea plantations have identified the plantations in two ways: as a private property for the management and a public space for the labourers. Stuck in time, tea gardens are a site of continued oppression and resistance. Both oppression and resistance find their manifestations particularly in two areas